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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/04/2006

Accident number: 57

Accident time: 11:00

Accident Date: 08/07/1997

Where it occurred: Cap. Agua, Uige

Country: Angola

Primary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Missed-mine accident
ID original source: MD/MJ/JP/TJ/SC

Date of main report: 16/07/1997
Name of source: INAROEE

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: PPM-2 AP blast

Ground condition: bushes/scrub
clay
grass/grazing area
hard

Date record created: 23/01/2004

Date last modified: 23/01/2004

No of victims: 3

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: Uige

Map series: Map 59

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name: 1:100 000

Accident Notes
victim ill (?)
inadequate communications (?)
handtool may have increased injury (?)
inadequate medical provision (?)
no independent investigation available (?)
safety distances ignored (?)
inadequate investigation (?)
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Accident report
An internal report from the demining group dated 16th July 1997 was made available. The
following summarises its content.
The investigators visited the site on 9/10th July. They found that the accident occurred in a
minefield laid by government troops in 1991/2. The mines were irregularly spaced in 3km long
lanes. PPM-2 and POMZ-2 mines were found (largely) in different parts of the field. There
was "scrub" about a metre high where the accident occurred and the ground was "hard clay
with some organic mix" which allowed the use of detectors. Two parallel lines of PPM-2 mines
had been found with an "exploratory base line". Further lanes were being cut to confirm the
direction of the mine-lines. The accident occurred in a lane that was beside another in which
the location of found mines had been marked with sticks after their removal. On the other side
of the accident lane, mines were "visible", so allowing a visual assessment of where the
mines could be expected.
Victim No.1 wore a frag-jacket and visor. The accident occurred when he was "due to start his
handover" at 11:00. The Commanders pointed out to him that he appeared to have missed a
mine and as he was "crouching down… his right foot slipped backwards and activated the
concealed mine". The Commanders were not wearing visors but were wearing frag-jackets.
At 11.42 the ambulance arrived at Uige hospital. At 15:10 the Medevac flight left for Luanda.
The investigators tested Victim No.1's metal detector and found it to be working properly.
They commented that there was no procedure to separate and test equipment involved in an
accident, [which implied they were uncertain whether they had tested the right detector].
Victim No.1's frag-jacket was damaged, but how extensively was not recorded.
The Brigade Commander said that he and the Section Commander approached Victim No.1
as he was demining and noticed a break in the mine-pattern. They "instructed the deminer to
return to a safe area and to recheck his lane". The accident occurred as he was returning to
the safe area.
The victim said that he was feeling unwell. He knew there were missed mines in his lane and
could see the pattern" and one mine. There was a concealed mine a metre in front of the
visible mine and he stepped on that.

Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the deminer "was focusing on the exposed mine.. and…did
not employ the detector correctly". He kept on working when others were too close. The
injuries to the Commanders were the result of them "being within a 25 metre distance of a
working deminer" and, in Victim No.3's case his injuries occurred because he was not
wearing the protective equipment available. The paramedics acted quickly and effectively but
the hospital was "ill equipped". Supervisors had to buy medical equipment to allow a blood
transfusion to take place. The communications equipment was "unsuitable". They found there
was a "lack of direction on discipline matters" from above, which had "impeded" the
supervisors, and commented that absenteeism was rife, with periods of up to one month's
absence common. Similarities with an accident that occurred in Angola in February 1997
were noted.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that the SOP requiring "safety equipment" to be worn at all
times should specify visors. Also that a procedure for "handling equipment" involved in an
accident must be devised, that disciplinary procedure for absenteeism should be formulated
and that the demining group should have a period of leave, followed by retraining. They
further recommended that all accident victims should be evacuated to Luanda and that
communications problems should be rectified.
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Victim Report
Victim number: 77

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 4 hours 10 minutes

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: Frag jacket

Long visor

Summary of injuries:

AMPUTATION/LOSS
Leg Below knee
Arm Below elbow
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Victim Report
Victim number: 78

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: Frag jacket

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Leg
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Victim Report
Victim number: 79

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: Frag jacket
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Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Eye
minor Face
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Management/control inadequacy" because the
procedures in place were inadequate to cover the situation.
The field supervisors noticed Victim No.1's errors but did not instruct him how best to recover
from the situation, were not wearing visors and were standing too close to the victim, so also
suffered injury. They were not criticised for this, although changes to procedures were
recommended. The secondary cause is listed as a “Field control inadequacy”.
The investigators made recommendations for improved medical and communication
procedures which imply that they did not work well, but the failings are not detailed in their
report.

Related papers
A document titled "Immediate action drill" was on file at the country MAC. The document
detailed what a deminer should do if he suddenly found himself in a mined area.
The Portuguese version of the accident report includes obvious errors of times, dates and
interpretation: the word "internal" is translated as "international" for example. [The failure to
transpose numerical data accurately implies a carelessness that may make the veracity of
translated reports suspect.]
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